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Summary
Medical errors and adverse events are a serious threat to pa-
tients worldwide. In recent years methodologically sound
studies have demonstrated that interventions exist, can be
implemented and can have sustainable, measurable posit-
ive effects on patient safety.
Nonetheless, system-wide progress and adoption of safety
practices is slow and evidence of improvements on the or-
ganisational and systems level is scarce and ambiguous.
This paper reports on the Swiss Patient Safety Conference
in 2011 and addresses emerging issues for patient safety
and future challenges.
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Background
In November 2011, approximately 550 professionals atten-
ded the international conference “Patient safety – moving
forward!” organised by the Swiss Patient Safety Found-
ation in Basel. The 2½-day programme included a pre-
conference, 11 plenary talks and 24 parallel sessions de-
signed as minicourses (abstracts are available at ht-
tp://www.patientensicherheit.ch/dms/de/Kongress/
Abstract-Band/Abstract-Band_final/Abstract-Band.pdf).
Participants had the opportunity to meet internationally ac-
knowledged patient safety experts and to exchange know-
ledge and experiences with national and international re-
searchers, practitioners, and health care executives. The
talks and presentations covered the entire range of patient
safety, from distinct clinical safety concerns and potential
solutions, methodological approaches and measurement is-
sues, to education in patient safety, legal aspects, public
health strategies and political concepts. Besides well-
known, but nevertheless urgent, matters such as medication
safety and nosocomial infections, several emerging issues
were discussed that have attracted increasing attention re-
cently.
Diagnostic errors – terra incognita
Diagnosis is the centrepiece of medical care. If the diagnos-
is is wrong the treatment will not be right. Diagnostic er-
rors include heuristics and biases in diagnostic reasoning,
failure to order, perform, follow-up and interpret tests at
the appropriate time, as well as errors in judgment and
decision-making, such as choosing and initiating the right
treatment. Research suggests that diagnostic errors pose a
common and serious threat to patients. In the Dutch ad-
verse event study based on chart review, adverse diagnostic
events occurred in 0.4% of hospital admissions and repres-
ented 6.4% of all adverse events [1]. Autopsy studies re-
veal an error rate of 10–15% [2, 3]. In one of the earlier ad-
verse event studies, the Harvard Medical Practice Study II,
diagnostic errors accounted for 17% of preventable adverse
events [4]. In a retrospective review of closed malpractice
claims 59% involved diagnostic errors that harmed patients
[5]. In physicians’ self-reports of diagnostic errors, the lat-
ter occurred most frequently in the testing phase (failure
to order, report, and follow-up laboratory results) (44%),
followed by clinician assessment errors (failure to con-
sider and overweighing competing diagnoses) (32%), his-
tory taking (10%), physical examination (10%), and refer-
ral or consultation errors and delays (3%) [6]. In a recent
analysis of diagnostic errors involving internists, cognitive
factors contributed to the diagnostic error in 74% of cases
[7]. The most common cognitive problems involved faulty
synthesis. Despite this evidence, diagnostic errors have
lagged behind other concerns since the start of the safety
field [8]. A number of causes may help to illuminate this
finding: first, diagnostic errors are among the errors most
embarrassing and unacceptable to the medical profession
and are often perceived as a lack of clinical competence.
Second, errors in diagnosis are hard to detect and identify.
In outpatient care in particular, it may take months, if ever,
until missed diagnoses are identified [9]. Third, a large pro-
portion of diagnostic errors are due to flawed reasoning and
overconfidence rather than technical failures, and there are
no easy solutions to hand for these types of error [10, 11].
It is thus not surprising that a number of interventions have
been suggested but few empirical studies have yet tested in-
terventions to prevent diagnostic errors and their associated
harm [12]. Electronic tracking of patients and implementa-
tion of computerised notification systems have been shown
to reduce failures in follow-up of test results [12]. Nendaz
and colleagues report that a case-based clinical reasoning
seminar, designed to give students insight into cognitive
features of their reasoning, improved aspects of diagnostic
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competence [13]. However, effects on safety outcomes still
need to be confirmed. Use of checklists to reduce diagnost-
ic errors has also been recommended by experts in the field
[14]. Clearly, considerable progress needs to be made in the
understanding and prevention of diagnostic errors during
the next decade.
Designing errors out of the clinical
environment
A fundamental experience in ethnographic observation of
care processes is that the clinical environment, be it a hos-
pital, a medical office, or a nursing home, seems as if it has
been designed to provoke errors. In many instances, cut-
ting edge clinical care is provided with infrastructure and
equipment that has not fundamentally changed in recent
decades. Clinicians that are able figuratively to step back
from their environment and look at it with fresh eyes are
often overwhelmed by the many major and minor obstacles
in everyday processes (and sometimes their triviality) that
are like sand in the gearbox: a cable of a diagnostic device
that is too short to allow for unrestricted movements; look-
alike medication boxes; a walk-through room designated
for patient handover; plasma bags whose bar code label is
crumpled or covered in a thick layer of ice; non-IV equip-
ment that is connectable with IV equipment; chemother-
apy patient records that require the administering nurse
to switch and scroll between landscape and portrait paper
formats. Nurses and physicians share a wealth of experien-
ce as to how they struggle with their work environment, in-
frastructure, equipment and materials, and they frequently
develop work-arounds and short-cuts to bypass these defi-
ciencies. Sometimes with serious risks for patient safety.
Figure 1
The newly designed CareCentre infection control station, designed
by the DOME project and manufactured by Bristol MaidTM. © Bristol
MaidTM 2011. Reprinted with kind permission.
While the relevance of human factors for the safety of tech-
nical devices has been recognised earlier [15], the import-
ance of interior design of rooms, equipment and materials
and work flow for patient safety on wards has long been
ignored. However, recent research suggests that sometimes
simple changes can have substantial effects on safety. For
example, Birnbach and colleagues used simulation-based
testing in real-size replications of proposed hospital ar-
chitectural designs [16]. Physicians examined standardised
patients in two hospital room replications that differed only
by the placement of the alcohol-based hand-rub dispenser.
The hand hygiene compliance rate was significantly higher
when the dispenser was in clear view of the physicians as
they observed the patient (54% sanitised their hands). Only
12% of physicians sanitised their hands when the dispenser
was not in their visual field. This is only one example of
how thoughtful design features, if properly evaluated and
assessed, can make patient safety “easy” for clinicians in
their everyday work.
At the Swiss conference, researchers presented results of
the DOME project (Designing Out Medical Error, avail-
able at http://www.domeproject.org.uk) [17, 18]. The pro-
ject aims to increase patient safety on surgical wards by de-
veloping equipment and products that fit the requirements
Figure 2
New trolley for bedside monitoring of vital signs with easy-clean
design and improved cable management, designed by the DOME
project. © The Helen Hamlyn Centre for Design, The Royal College
of Art 2011. Reprinted with kind permission.
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of healthcare processes and staff. In prior research five
error-prone processes were identified and prioritised for ac-
tion: hand disinfection, information handover, vital signs
monitoring, isolation of infection, and medication deliv-
ery. The approach followed by DOME is groundbreaking
in several respects: it is truly multidisciplinary and com-
bines expertise from clinicians, safety experts, design spe-
cialists, psychologists, and ergonomists. Second, DOME
is strongly devoted to research. The team used several
methodological approaches to map care processes and un-
derstand the work-flow and requirements of health care
workers’ tasks. Interventions were designed for each of the
error-prone processes and tested in a simulated ward en-
vironment in repeated evaluation and improvement cycles.
Finally, the research team cooperates with manufacturers to
ensure that safe designs are spread and produced en masse.
DOME does thus not design nice-looking (but unusable)
toys with no added value. Oliver Anderson and his col-
leagues from Imperial College London presented the out-
comes of the DOME project at the Basel patient safety
conference to an enthusiastic and excited reception from
participants. One of the most powerful products is an all-in-
one infection control station for the end of a patient’s bed
(fig. 1). The CareCentre is equipped with an alcohol gel
dispenser, integrated gloves and aprons, a medication lock-
er, a flat surface for writing, a folder holder, and a touch-
free, infrared controlled bin. Infection prevention practices
improved significantly with the new CareCenter (53% ad-
herence with CareCentre vs. 16% adherence with control;
unpublished data presented at the Basel conference). A
new, easy-to-clean trolley was designed for measurement
of vital signs at the bedside (fig. 2). Some of the new inter-
ventions are currently under investigation in clinical trials,
such as a respiratory rate recorder for reliable and accurate
manual measurement of vital signs at the bedside. DOME
is a promising and innovative project, regarding both the
approach to improvements in safety as well as the designed
products.
Where have we gone so far and how
do we know?
In recent years, methodologically sound studies have
shown that improvements in patient safety are feasible and
realistic.
Peter Pronovost and colleagues have developed and imple-
mented an evidence-based multifaceted intervention to re-
duce the incidence of catheter-related bloodstream infec-
tions in intensive care units (ICUs) [19]. The programme
consists of three core elements: translating evidence into
practice at the bedside, improving culture and teamwork,
and having a data collection system to monitor central
catheter-associated bloodstream infections and other relev-
ant measures [20]. In the initial study more than 100 ICUs
in the US implemented specific procedures (hand washing,
full-barrier precautions during the insertion of central ven-
ous catheters, cleaning the skin with chlorhexidine, avoid-
ing the femoral site, and removing unnecessary catheters)
and monitored the effects on infection rates. The median
rate of catheter-related bloodstream infection decreased
from 2.7 (mean 7.7) infections per 1000 catheter-days at
baseline to 0 (mean 2.3) at 0 to 3 months after implementa-
tion of the study intervention and was sustained at 0 (mean
1.4) during 18 months’ follow-up. The incidence-rate ratios
decreased continuously from 0.62 (at 0 to 3 months after
implementation) to 0.34 (at 16 to 18 months). In other
words, patients’ risk of acquiring catheter-related blood-
stream infection decreased substantially by two thirds. In
a retrospective comparative study the project also achieved
significant decreases in inpatient mortality in the state of
Michigan compared with the surrounding area [21].
In a multinational study Haynes and colleagues investig-
ated the effects of the WHO surgical safety checklist [22].
This 19-item checklist is used at three stages in surgic-
al care (before induction of anaesthesia, immediately be-
fore incision, and before the patient leaves the operating
room). The checklist is completed by the surgical team and
requires oral confirmation of the completion of essential
steps in care provision, such as antibiotic prophylaxis, sur-
gical site marking, and team time-out. Considerable im-
provements in mortality and morbidity were recorded in
both low and high income countries, and in emergency op-
erations in particular [23]. Comparable results have been
obtained with similar surgical checklists such as the
SURPASS tool [24]. A systematic review and meta-analys-
is estimated that with the use of WHO or SURPASS check-
lists the relative risk is 0.57 for surgical mortality and 0.63
for any inpatient complication [25]. A recent study con-
firmed the positive effects of the checklist on patient safety,
but only in patients for whom the checklist was fully com-
pleted [26]. Patients did not benefit from partial completion
or complete noncompliance with the checklist. At the Basel
conference, several researchers and practitioners reported
local experiences with the checklist.
Other examples of effective patient safety interventions in-
clude the large scale introduction of surgical team train-
ing to lower surgical mortality [27], a nurse-led programme
which reduces medication error rates by implementation
of six medication administration safety processes [28, 29],
pharmacist-led medication reconciliation [30, 31], and use
of information technology [32–34] (table 2). These success
stories confirm that interventions exist, can be implemen-
ted and can have sustainable, measurable positive effects
and make a difference in patient safety. But what have we
achieved on the systems level since the US Institute of
Medicine published their report “To Err is Human” in 2000
[35]? Has healthcare become safer? Have risks for the “av-
erage patient” seeking care significantly declined in recent
years? Is it ultimately time to sit back, relax and bring in
the harvest?
The evidence on this question is mixed and not as unam-
biguous and positive as one would hope after reviewing
the evidence on successful interventions. On the organ-
isational and systems level, improvements in safety are
not easily achieved, and not even easily measured. For
example, Landrigan et al. investigated temporal trends in
rates of patient harm caused by medical care in North
Carolina, a state with above average engagement in safety
campaigns [36]. The researchers applied the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement’s Global Trigger Tool for Meas-
uring Adverse Events to patient records of patients dis-
charged from 10 randomly selected hospitals between 2002
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and 2007. They found harm to be persistently common and
no significant decreases in the rate of harms over time.
Rates of preventable harms and harms of greater severity
also remained stable during the 6-year period. At the Swiss
conference Maike Langelaan and colleagues reported the
results of two adverse events studies based on chart review
methodology conducted in hospitals in the Netherlands
[37]. The first Dutch adverse event study conducted in
2004 [38] was followed by several patient safety cam-
paigns and a second adverse event study in 2008. There
was no significant decrease in preventable adverse events
between the study periods. Charles Vincent presented sim-
ilar data from France in his plenary talk [39].
Results from the UK “Safer Patients Initiative” (SPI1 and
SPI2), a large scale safety improvement programme, are
complex and ambivalent [40, 41]. Improvements in safety
climate, practices and outcomes have been achieved in
both control hospitals and hospitals that participated in SPI.
However, only a few selective incremental effects of the
initiative were detectable. In other words, improvements
over time were observed on many safety items such as
consumption of hand disinfectants and simultaneously de-
creasing rates of Clostridium difficile and methicillin resist-
ant Staphylococcus aureus, but the difference in differen-
ces between control and SPI hospitals was not significant.
Of 57 quantitative outcome measures, 24 favoured the SPI
hospitals, 22 favoured the control hospitals and in 11 out-
comes there was no difference at all [41]. One of the ma-
jor explanations for the counterintuitive results of SPI2
was the spread of contemporaneous policy and profession-
al forces in the control environment. During the study peri-
od of SPI other safety campaigns were underway and im-
provement activities accelerated in many hospitals. Rather
than testing the effect of “treatment”, SPI was thus more
like evaluating “dose” and it can be concluded that the
“dose” given in SPI was too small to achieve incremental
effects compared to the control dose.
A number of lessons can be learned from the SPI experien-
ce: First, the programme directors and commissioners are
to be congratulated on the efforts and resources expended
on evaluation and the use of concurrent controls in particu-
lar. Without these controls the improvements over time ob-
served in SPI hospitals would have been causally linked
to SPI, and may have masked how improvements were
achieved, making it even harder to generalise and transfer
the approach to other settings. Second, improvement pro-
grammes should be designed and interventions should be
selected on the basis of baseline data, i.e., actual safety tar-
gets. One problem with SPI was that hospitals were already
performing to high standards and improvements are then
hard to achieve and measure. Third, measurement and data
quality control are crucial for any patient safety improve-
ment project and have long been ignored as a key – and
resource-intensive – force [42]. Fourth, the SP initiative
may have been too diffuse and not well-grounded in theor-
ies of organisational change [43]. Interventions and meas-
ures need to be evidence-based, pilot-tested and accepted
by clinicians. Different areas of patient safety probably
need different theories of change, methods, interventions,
and measures, but all should be based on “health care de-
livery” science [44]. The call for more science is justified
in particular for large-scale improvement programmes for
which we do not yet fully understand what works and why.
Ex-post theorisation seems a valuable approach to increas-
ing improvement programmes' generalisability and trans-
ferability to other settings [45].
Above all: accountability
One reason for the observation that system-wide progress
in patient safety is slow is that compliance even with
simple and inexpensive interventions such as hand disin-
fection remains low [36] and the penetration of evidence-
based safety practices has been quite modest and often
needs years of change [46]. It is surprising that this slow
and fractious progress seems to be to some extent accepted
by health policy leaders and clinicians, given the safety epi-
demic and the widespread perception of medical error in
the general public. For example, in a recent citizen sur-
vey conducted in eleven high-income countries, one out
of ten citizens reported medical or medication error [47].
However, this rate varied widely between countries (range:
5% in the UK, 11% in Switzerland, 13% in the US, 16% in
Norway).
Table 1: Conference participants’ backgrounds, results from the evaluation survey (n = 327).
Background characteristic n (%)
Female gender 184 57%
Educational background
Medicine 93 28%
Nursing 114 35%
Pharmacy 20 6%
Quality/risk management 105 32%
Administration, economics, law 50 15%
Other 44 13%
Current workplace
Hospital 229 70%
Nursing home 8 2%
Outpatient care 12 4%
Public administration 15 5%
Insurance business 4 1%
Consultancy 12 4%
Educational institute 23 7%
Other 38 12%
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In many countries adoption of safe medication practices
has been particularly slow and surveillance data of adverse
drug events are generally lacking [46, 48]. Longo at al. re-
port on a survey among all acute care hospitals in Missouri
and Utah in 2002 and 2004 which assessed the develop-
ment, implementation and spread of patient safety systems
such as computerised test results, drug storage, administra-
tion and safety procedures, or handling of adverse event/
error reporting. The results show that improvements have
been achieved in many items over time, but are only mod-
est at best. It is striking that in 2002 only 28% of hospitals
had a patient safety programme budget. This figure rose to
39% in 2004 but is still disappointing. Clearly, great care
must be taken to ensure that the public does not lose con-
fidence in, and patience with, the health care system, and
that the safety movement does not end up in circularities.
There are instances in which individual clinicians, pro-
viders, executives and directors, health care leaders, and
health care system administrations are to be held account-
able: for not investing in safety programmes, for not
providing their staff with the necessary support and re-
sources, for not teaching and instructing students and res-
idents in the cornerstones of safety, for not implementing
evidence-based safety standards, for not using hard edges,
and, when all is said and done, for not disinfecting their
hands. As Robert Wachter argues, (no) blame needs to be
sensitively balanced with accountability [49].
At the Swiss conference, accountability, and sometimes
lack thereof, was noticeable. It was noticeable and encour-
aging in each and every report of clinicians and other pro-
fessionals that devote their time and efforts to promoting
change in patient safety.
However, it was also noticeable in what was not present.
Our subjective impressions at the conference are confirmed
by participant evaluation. Table 1 displays background
characteristics of conference participants that responded to
the electronic evaluation survey (60% response rate). One
number in the table is eye-catching, and disturbing: the re-
latively low fraction of physicians among participants. The
limited participation by physicians is not a matter of chance
but seems to some extent symptomatic. One common con-
cern of quality and risk managers when discussing oppor-
tunities for participation in safety projects or implementa-
tion of safety measures is: what can I do to get clinical staff
involved? In fact, a major obstacle for any patient safety
initiative is the motivation of physicians, and, to a less-
er extent, nurses. Hours over hours are spent considering
how evidence-based patient safety measures, like the sur-
gical safety checklist or hand hygiene, can be made “taste-
ful”, what clinicians need to adapt the recommended be-
haviours, and what incentives hospitals can implement to
increase staff compliance. Indeed, sometimes it feels like
“pushing an elephant up the stairs”.
Why is this?
The vast majority of clinicians are involved in safety every
day. Preventing harm to individual patients is central to
most clinicians and belongs to the intrinsic motivation of
health professionals. Ironically, the same clinicians are of-
ten reluctant to engage in system-wide safety initiatives.
To many physicians, saving additional lives (through ad-
vanced therapy) seems psychologically more attractive
than avoiding deaths through prevention of harm. It is
much easier to enthuse surgeons about a new microinvasive
device, or innovations such as fast-track surgery, than about
the surgical safety checklist, team training, or structured
handovers. Asked why he did not attend the Swiss Patient
Conference, a senior consultant argued: Yes, it’s certainly
interesting. But I do not have the time. Inspiration about
patient safety would be a nice-to-have but keeping up with
developments in my clinical area is more directly relevant
because that is what is expected from me. This statement
reveals a fundamental misconception: that patient safety
is something “additional” to clinical care provision. In the
same way as the safety movement has long failed to em-
brace science, clinical medicine is still too often failing
to embrace the patient safety agenda. The unavailability
of safety data at the local level has been identified as a
major barrier to clinician engagement in safety [48]. It is
simply unacceptable that in many Swiss hospitals, clini-
cians do not have monitoring data about hand disinfection
compliance rates at their department regularly available.
Similarly, at most hospitals no data is available regarding
medication safety, including safe administration practices,
or diagnostic performance. It is hardly possible to engage
clinicians in safety if you cannot even document the target.
In addition to the data availability problem, clinicians often
underestimate the impact of human factors, system and
process design, and communication on safety. The best sur-
geon in the theatre and the best physician on ward is no
guarantee of safety if the handover between and across
professions is unstructured, incomplete or erroneous. Put
simply, safety is more than the sum of dedicated and safe-
acting individuals.
From the various reports presented at the Swiss Patient
Safety Conference it can be concluded that there is still
a long way to go on the safety journey, but considerable
improvements are achievable. Collaboration, expertise and
engagement from clinicians, safety experts, health services
researchers and psychologists is needed – the recent meet-
ing in Basel proved that this community exists – and is
growing.
Table 2: Examples of effective patient safety interventions.
Targeted patient safety problem Intervention
Catheter-related bloodstream infections Implementation of specific evidence-based procedures, improving culture and teamwork, and
infection incidence monitoring [19]
Surgical mortality and morbidity Surgical safety checklists [22, 24]
Surgical mortality Team training [27]
Medication errors Implementation of six medication administration safety processes [28, 29]
Adverse drug events Pharmacist-led medication reconciliation [30, 31]
Medication errors / adverse drug events Information technology, e.g. electronic prescribing [32–34]
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Figures (large format)
Figure 1
The newly designed CareCentre infection control station, designed by the DOME project and manufactured by Bristol MaidTM. © Bristol MaidTM
201. Reprinted with kind permission.
Review article: Current opinion Swiss Med Wkly. 2012;142:w13634
Swiss Medical Weekly · PDF of the online version · www.smw.ch Page 8 of 9
Figure 2
New trolley for bedside monitoring of vital signs with easy-clean design and improved cable management, designed by the DOME project. ©
The Helen Hamlyn Centre for Design, The Royal College of Art 2011. Reprinted with kind permission.
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